



# **Constructing Semantics-Aware Adversarial Examples** with a Probabilistic Perspective

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# So What? What Can This Perspective Bring to Us?

The probabilistic perspective enables us to replace traditional geometry-based distance distributions with those fitted by modern probabilistic generative models (PGMs). Using PGMs as distance distributions offers two key advantages:

**Semantic Injection:** We can incorporate subjective semantic understanding by training a PGM on semantic-preserving transformations of the original input data  $x_{ori}$ .

Model Adaptation: We can leverage pretrained PGMs to create semantically similar distributions around a single image  $x_{ori}$ through fine-tuning.

Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be transformations that preserve  $x_{ori}$ 's semantics. Training a PGM on  $t_i(x_{ori})$  where  $t_i \in \mathcal{T}$  defines  $p_{dis}$ . This allows encoding semantic beliefs into  $p_{dis}$  – e.g., including rotation, scaling and distortion in  $\mathcal{T}$  if they're deemed semantics-preserving. The adversarial examples based on this  $p_{dis}$ is shown on the right.



### **Review: Adversarial Examples**

Given a victim classifier  $C: [0,1]^n \to \mathcal{Y}$ , an image  $x_{\text{ori}} \in [0,1]^n$  and a target label  $y_{tar} \in \mathcal{Y}$ , the optimization problem for finding an adversarial instance  $x_{adv}$  for  $x_{ori}$  can be formulated as follows [2]:

min  $\mathcal{D}(x_{\text{ori}}, x_{\text{adv}})$  s.t.  $C(x_{\text{adv}}) = y_{\text{tar}}$  and  $x_{\text{adv}} \in [0, 1]^n$  (1)

Here,  $\mathcal{D}$  is a distance can be represented by  $\mathcal{L}_1$ ,  $\mathcal{L}_2$ , or  $\mathcal{L}_\infty$  norms.

However, solving (1) is challenging. [2] propose a relaxation:

min  $c_1 \mathcal{D}(x_{\text{ori}}, x_{\text{adv}}) + c_2 f(x_{\text{adv}}, y_{\text{tar}})$  s.t.  $x_{\text{adv}} \in [0, 1]^n$  (2)

where  $c_1$ ,  $c_2$  are constants, and f is an objective function closely tied to the classifier C's prediction. For example, in [2], f could be the cross-entropy loss function.

# Adversarial Examples: A Probabilistic Perspective

By applying box-constrained Langevin dynamics (LD) [1] as an optimization method to (2), we get a Gibbs distribution:

> $p_{
> m adv}(x_{
> m adv}|x_{
> m ori},y_{
> m tar}) \propto p_{
> m vic}(x_{
> m adv}|y_{
> m tar})p_{
> m dis}(x_{
> m adv}|x_{
> m ori})$ (3)

where  $p_{\rm vic}(x_{\rm adv}|y_{\rm tar}) \propto \exp(-c_2 f(x_{\rm adv},y_{\rm tar}))$  and  $p_{\rm dis}(x_{\rm adv}|x_{\rm ori}) \propto$  $\exp(-c_1 \mathcal{D}(x_{\text{ori}}, x_{\text{adv}})).$ 

Victim Distribution. By LD, we can sample from  $p_{\rm vic}$  of the adversarially trained victim classifier. The samples (right) display clear digit structures, indicating the robust classifier's semantic understanding and resistance to deception.

Distance Distribution. Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be the squared  $\mathcal{L}_2$  norm, defined as  $\mathcal{D}(a,b) = ||a - b|$  $\|b\|_2^2$  - a common choice in adversarial attacks. The resulting distance distribution  $p_{dis}$  is a Gaussian distribution, with samples (for a suitable constant  $c_1$ ) shown on the right.

Adversarial Distribution. As illustrated in (3), the adversarial distribution is the product of  $p_{\rm vic}$  and  $p_{\rm dis}$ . The samples drawn from  $p_{adv}$  (right) use appropriate values of  $c_1, c_2$ and target class  $y_{tar} = 1$ . Green borders indicate successful attacks.





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## **Semantics-Invariant Data Augmentation**



#### **Fine-Tuning Pretrained PGMs**

By finetuning a pretrained PGM on  $x_{ori}$ , we obtain  $p_{dis}$  around  $x_{ori}$ . Below are samples drawn from  $p_{adv}$  compared with other methods.



#### **Concrete PGM Implementations**

We introduce two concrete PGM implementations for  $p_{dis}$ :

**Energy-based Model:** Let  $E_{\theta}$  denote the energy in the EBM that is trained / finetuned around  $x_{ori}$ , then the adversarial distribution is  $p_{
m adv}(x_{
m adv}|x_{
m ori},y_{
m tar}) \propto e^{-cf(x_{
m adv},y_{
m tar})} e^{-E_{ heta}(x_{
m adv})}$ 

with the corresponding Stein score:

 $\nabla_{x_{\text{adv}}} \log p_{\text{adv}}(x_{\text{adv}}|\dots) = -c \nabla_{x_{\text{adv}}} f(x_{\text{adv}}, y_{\text{tar}}) - \nabla_{x_{\text{adv}}} E_{\theta}(x_{\text{adv}}) \quad (4)$ 

Samples from  $p_{adv}$  can then be drawn using Langevin dynamics (LD).

**Diffusion Model:** Let  $\theta$  be the parameters of a diffusion model that is trained / finetuned around  $x_{ori}$ , then

 $p_{\mathsf{adv}}(x_0|x_{\mathsf{ori}},y_{\mathsf{tar}})$ 

where  $\hat{x}_{0|t} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\bar{\alpha}_t}}(x_t - \sqrt{1 - \bar{\alpha}_t} \epsilon_{\theta}(x_t))$  is estimated by Tweedie's formula as we cannot obtain  $x_0$  at every sampling step. Theorem 2 in the paper shows that  $p_{\text{vic}}(\hat{x}_{0|t}|y_{\text{tar}})^{1/T}p_{\theta}(x_{t-1}|x_t)$  is Gaussian. Algorithm 2 in the paper illustrates how to draw samples from this  $p_{adv}$ .

Just Another Diffusion + Adv. Attack Work? No. While combining these methods may seem intuitive, previous works have largely approached this combination in an ad hoc manner. In contrast, our work is derived from the classical optimization problem defined in (2) and provides a principled probabilistic perspective on adversarial examples. For example, as shown in (4), our method naturally leads to the addition of generative and adversarial gradients through mathematical derivation, rather than through intuitive design.

How to Defend it? Our method circumvents robust classifiers since they are typically trained against conventional adversarial examples, not our semantic-preserving ones. However, defenders could adapt by incorporating our generated examples into their training process, creating a new form of adversarial training.

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$$p(x) \propto p_{\text{vic}}(x_0|y_{\text{tar}}) \int p(x_T) \prod_{t=1}^T p_{ heta}(x_{t-1}|x_t) dx_{1...T}$$
  
 $pprox \int p(x_T) \prod_{t=1}^T p_{ ext{vic}}(\hat{x}_{0|t}|y_{ ext{tar}})^{1/T} p_{ heta}(x_{t-1}|x_t) dx_{1...T}$ 

#### FAQs

#### References

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